Jaindhram.com
By : Acharya Mahapragya
The Concomitance between the Universal and the Particular.
We can know the truth and also express it. It consists in the trio of entity, word and knowledge. Different philosophies have looked at the problem from different angles of vision. The vedanta has explained the problem from three standpoints - the ultimate, the empirical and the apparent. The Brahman is the ultimate truth, while the sensuous world has only empirical validity. The cognition of the 'will' the wisp and dream is pure appearance. In Hinayana Buddhism the truth is twofold, viz. the ultimate and the conventional, while in the idealist Buddhism it is threefold, viz. the ultimate (parinispanna), the dependent (paratantra) and the imaginary (parikalpita). The self nature (momentarines) of the object is the ultimate truth. The universal nature is only a conventional truth on account os its being a product os the intellectual function os exclusion.
From the
synthetic viewpoint the object is without modes and from the analytic standpoint it is
unsubstantial. "You have realized, Oh Lord, the truth in its sevenfold aspects on
account of sevenfold view-points, that reveals itself only to the Wise."
The substance
presents itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach
is analytical, the modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative
period of anekanta some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that
constituted an epoch making achievements of that age.
The first
axiom of non absolution is the concomitance of the universal and the particular. The one
without the order is inconceivable. The upshot is that a mode without the substance is as
impossible as a substance without a mode. There is no such gap between truth and untruth.
There is hardly any line of demarcation between the truth of the concept and the falsity
of another. The gap between them, if any, can be understood if one realizes that the
particular bereft of universal is as nonsensical as the universal bereft of the
particular. Both the concepts, viz. the universal and the particular, are true if they are
mutually dependent. One rejecting the order is false, while both are true representatives
of their own objects of reference.
Concomitance between the permanent and the Impermanent
The second axion of non absolution is the concomitance of
the permanent and the impermanent, the truth of the one is verified by the truth os the
other.
The materialist thinks that the sensuous world
alone is true. There is nothing like the spiritual. The spiritualist. The
spiritualist, on the hand, asserts that it is the self alone that is true, the sensuous
world is false. The logicians of the Jain school investigated the truth behind the rival
claims and found that the sensuous world was not false. Whatever is possessed of causal
efficiency is true. The senses are causally efficient and hence cannot be untrue. Their
objects also cannot be false. The characteristic features of a real are origination,
cessation and persistence. Whatever is causally efficient does necessarily arise, cease to
exist and also continue. To say that the sensuous world is true and the self is untrue can
be possible only in ordinary parlour, but it can
never be a language expressive os the truth that is
deep and unfathomable. On the other hand, to say that the self alone is the ultimate
truth while the sensuous world is unadulterated falsehood , can be the
language of the spiritual world,
but it can never be true of the world as it is. The saints and philosophers
cannot express themselves in
identical linguistic tools. In spiritual idiom could inspire detachment and
renunciation, but would miserably
fail as a device of logical investigation of the nature of truth. Logic does not
distinguish between the reality of
the sensuous object and the reality of the self. The material atoms are as real as the
spiritual self in the eyes of
the rationalist. All that originates, vanishes and persists is real. This triple
criterion of truth is as validly applicable
to the material atom as to the spiritual self. When the spiritual values doctrine. All the
spiritual thinkers. without any exception have endorsed it The Jainas also have
assigned adequate importance to it. Among the twelve ntemplations, impermanent
But that belongs to the sphere of spirituality. As soon as one switches to rational
thinking, it is the definite view of the jaina philosophers that the discrepancy
between the impermanence of the material and the permanence of the spiritual becomes
untenable. To the reasoning mind the permanence and the impermanence are equally
shared by the spiritual and the material world. A clear line of
demarcation can never be drawn between permanence and impermanence. By the admission of
such distinction the samkhya system
has to assign both bondage and emancipation to Prakrti ( the primordial
matter) instead of Purusa
of whom two were only metaphorically admissible. The Purusa is eternally free
and pure. The admission of
bondage and emancipation would make the latter amenable to change and impermanence,
a position which could not be
acceptable to the Samkhya system.
Among the
Jainas, Acharya Kundakunda has also asserted, like the Samkhya, that the Jiva (the soul)
is not the agent of Karma. If the
soul were the agent of Karma, he would never be free from it. And it is exactly
because he is not the agent, he is capable of getting rid
of karma. From the absolute substantial standpoint, it is true that the nature can never change. Consciousness has a specific
nature which is conscious. It can never lapse. Self-awareness is its specific function. How could then it be the
agent of the karma which is a heterogeneous
entity ? This is the standpoint of pure substance, independent of any adventitious
adjunct.One can defend the Samkhya's assignment of bondage and
emancipation to the prakrti. In the language of Jainism one can similarly say
that it is only Karmic body that is subject to bondage and emancipation. From the
semi-absolute substantial standpoint one could assert that the Jiva (the soul) is
the agent of Karma. The substantial standpoint is concerned exclusively with
the universal. The mode sinks into insignificance when the universal is predominant.
Permanence is true because a thing not only exists but exists forever. An entity's
continuance for long gives an impression of its uninterrupted continuity. When we
concentrate on the similar or the identical aspects of a thing, the philosophy of
identity, universality or substance presents itself as the only valid alternative. the
flow of origination and cessation is going on without interruption. How could one say that
the mountain that hi ancestors saw still continues to exist? or the person in front is the
same whom he saw yesterday ? The old atoms are constantly giving birth to new ones. a
person's atomic physical conglomerate being constantly emitted and replaced by a
facsimile. In the absence of such emission the method of the photography of the absent
object could never be successful. This movement of atoms proves impermanence of the
substance. The successive vision of similar modes gives an impression of impermanence.
Under these two diverse situations how should we distinguish between truth of permanence
and impermanence? The falsity of the one would entail the truth of the other, which would
lead to the controversy that exists between rival camps, each believing in one or the
alternative. Non-obsolutism, however does not admit the absolute validity of anyone of
these alternative. According to it neither permanence independent of impermanence nor
impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth, both being true only
relatively. There is no creation , according to Kundakunda, without destruction and no
destruction without creation and no creation-cum-destruction without continuity or
eternity. The synthesis of the three --creation, destruction and continuity-- is the
truth. the instantaneous modality (arthaparyaya) is the mode that is momentary, according
to which the mountain or man standing in front cannot be the same as had been seen ten
years ago. The prolonged modality (vyanjanaparyaya), on the other hand, is one that
continues for an appreciably long time, according to which the mountain or the man
standing before is the same as had been seen ten years ago. In instantaneous modality the
recognition of similarity is absent while in prolonged modality it is predominant. To
deduce impermanence and permanence respectively from dissimilarity is only a truth and not
the truth that is ultimate. The dissimilarity in instantaneous modality as well as
similarity in prolonged modality are nothing but modes which would entail impermanence. In
the unending chain of causality there comes a moment when a mountain or man, as entity,
ceases to exist and dissolves in atoms which however, do continue to exist in the eternity
of time and space. The soul that infused life in that body does likewise never cease to
exist. The condition of permanence is the basic substance. A mode, whether momentary or
continuos, dissimilar or similar, does a rule establish impermanence
The approach
or the viewpoint (naya) of universality and permanence it the standpoint of substance
(dravyarthika naya) while that of particularity and
change as origination-cum-cessation is the standpoint of modes (paryayarthika naya)
These two are the basic standpoint that are mutually relative. From the relativity
of these two are derived the two principles of non -
absolutism, viz. identity -cum- difference of the universal and the particular, and the relativity or permances-cum- impermanence
The concomitance of
existence and non-existence
The third axiom of non -absolutism is the concomitance of
existence and non-existence it is some times argued
that because the surface of are wooden chair is
hard, it bears weight because it is soft, an axe can cut through it. And because hardness
and softness contracted each other, they cannot co-exist. But as they appear co-exist,
both of them are only appearance and not reality. And
along with their unreality the wooden chair is unreal. This is not the way of non
absolutism, which regards and infinity numbers of mutually opposed attributes as an
inalienable part of a real. A real is an integrated whole
of infinity number of atributes. It is exactly because those attributes are mutually
opposed that a real is a real in the true sense of the term. Opposition in fact is the
richness of the real and in the absence of such opposition would be denuded of its
reality. It is indeed the intrinsic nature of a real to be possessed of such opposed
attributes and if so why should an attempt be made to deny its reality, by getting
ourselves entangled in the labyrinth of imaginary contradictions. As Dharmakirtti puts it,
who are we to deny what commends itself to the objects themselves ? What should excise our
mind is the search for the source
of those opposition and the conditions of the synthesis. The philosophy of non-absolutism
made such search and found that existence and non-existence go together. Affirmation
without negation and negation
without affirmation is never possible. Affirmation is as much an attribute of a real as
the negation . Existence is
affirmation and non-existence is negation. The intrinsic nature of a substance is the
source of existence while the extrinsic nature of a substance is the source of
non-existence. The substance of earth of which a pot is made is it's own substance.
Similarly the pot has it's own space, time, colour and shape. A pot exists with reference
to it's own substance, space, time and modes. But it is non-existent as alien substance,
space. time and modes. This relative estimation is a principle of synthesis. A pot does
not both exist and not exist with reference identical factors of reference. Existence and
non-existence as mutually opposed attributes do certainly exist simultaneously in the same
object. But the basic conditions of the two (viz. existence and non-existence) are not
identical. The principle of relativity points to the way of synthesis and testifies the
reality of co-existence.
Acharya
Akalanka has mentioned a no. of reasons for the admission of existence and non-existence.
A pot exists with reference to it's own nature, it does not exist with reference to an
alien nature. This argument leads us to investigate the meaning of 'own nature and 'alien
nature'. Akalanka's reply is - the own nature refers to the things that is responsible for
the application of the 'pot concept' and the 'pot word', and what is not amenable to
such usage is the alien nature. The affirmation of the own nature and the denial of the
alien nature established the reality of a thing. If the alien nature, viz. a piece of
cloth, is not excluded from the own nature, viz. the pot, the word 'pot' would be
applicable as designation to all things. And inspite of such exclusion, if the own nature
of the pot is not cognised, the latter would be a non-entity like a hare's horn.
The
specifically intended pot again passes through a no. of phases. Anyone among these phases
is the own nature while the preceding and succeeding phases are it's alien nature.
An
intermediate phase of the independent pot again is constantly subject to growth and decay.
Therefore the state of the present moment is the own nature while the past and future
states are the alien natures. If the existence of the pot is determinable by the past and
future moments, exactly in the fashion of the present moment, then all pots-past, presents
and future-should together be existent at any one moment. The same logic will apply to the
nature of non-existence. In other words, if a particular non-existence were determinable
by all the past and future non-existences in the same fashion as the present non-existence
is determined by its own nature, the upshot will be that any particular moment of
non-existence is a totality of all non-existences- past, present and future. Existence and
non-existence must each have its own nature, in the absence of which they would lose their
identity.
Again the
momentary pot has a good many qualities and modes like colour, taste smell, form etc. We
know its existence by seeing its colour with our eyes, and in this context the colour is
the own nature, while taste etc. of which we are not aware at the moment, are the alien
nature. Had taste etc. been the own nature like the colour of the pot, visible at the
moment, then the former would be of the nature of colour, on account of being cognised
along with the colour by the eye. And as a result the conception of sense, other than the
eye, will be a futile imagination.
Epistemologically viewed, the idea of pot consequent upon the usage of the word 'pot' is
the own nature (of pot), while the shape of the pot outside is the alien nature.
Consciousness
has two aspects:
(1) The aspect of being a cognition, just like an imageless mirror.
(2) The aspects of being possessed of the cognitum, just like a mirror
with an image.
Of these two,
the aspects of being possessed of a cognitum is the own nature ( of a pot ). In other
words, in the epistemological situation the pot qua the cognitum is the own nature while
the cognition itself is the alien nature. The criterion is that the point of focus is the
own nature while the other auxiliary conditions of the alien nature. The own nature in
it's essence is the object on which our cognition is fixed. Otherwise all things would be
indeterminable. Thus if a pot is considered as nothing other than the cognition itself,
than all other things like a piece of cloth etc., as cognita would be identical with the
pot. Exactly similar consequences will follow if non-existence of a pot is identified with
the cognition itself because in that case, non-existence being something indeterminable,
the entity called pot would not be amenable to any kind of treatment, ontological or
practical.
The
Concomitance of the Speakable and the Unspeakable
The fourth axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of
the speakable and the unspeakable. A substance is possessed of an infinite number of
attributes,. It is however, not possible to express in language those infinite number of
attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of
language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of this
infinitude of the space of a thing. Only one attribute can at best be spoken of in one
moment and many in many moments, but never all during any stretch of time. A thing is thus
speakable with reference to only a limited no. of it's attributes.
The Wide
Range of Non-absolutism
The above four axioms
are the foundation of non-absolutism. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy this
tetrad of axioms was fully exploited in the solution of logical problems. The growth and
development of the epistemological apparatus also did not detract from the importance of
these basic axioms. It was always appreciated that the epistemological apparatus itself
needed the services of non-absolutism for its own systematic development. Non-absolutism,
in fact, was a most comprehensive principle that determined the nature of Jaina thought in
all its branches, social, ethical, psychological, ontological, metaphysical and the like.
it was Acharya Siddhasena with whom the application of non-absolutism to the various
branches of Jaina thought started. After dealing with the nature of varieties of the valid
sources of knowledge, Siddhasena added, at the end of his Nyayavatara, an
investigation, into the nature of non-absolutism signifying its unavoidability in every
such treatise. Akalanka, Vidyananda, Haribhadra, Manikyanandi, vadideva, Hemacandra and
others also discussed the problem of valid knowledge in the light of non-absolutism. The
principle of non-absolutism was not in the least adversely affected with the development
of the science of logic and epistemology, but its importance was rather enhanced as a
criterion of the investigation of the nature of logico-epistemological tools. And as a
result the concomitance of being and non-being, one and many etc. was gradually firmly
established, and Jaina metaphysics developed with the growth of the logical thought.
There is
however, no reason to believe that these axioms of non-absolutism were not effective in
the Agamic period. Nor is it a valid assumption that these axioms were discovered in the
period of philosophical speculations. The difference, if any, lay in the spheres of the
application of these axioms in those two periods. In the Agamic period, the principles
were applied mainly in the field of ontology, while in the speculative age it was in
demand for the synthesis of philosophical issues of all types.
The Concomitance of Being and Non-being
The following dialogue between Lord Mahavira and his
disciple Gautama throws welcome light on the problem.
Gautama : O
Lord ! Does being change into being ? Does non-being change into non-being ?
Lord : Yes,
Gautama ! This is exactly so.
Gautama : O
Lord ! Does this change of being into being and non-being into non-being take place owing
to some effort or occur spontaneously ?
Lord : Gautama
! It is effected by effort and also occurs spontaneously.
Gautama : O
Lord ! Does your non-being change into non-being exactly in the same way as your being
changes in to being ? Similarly does your being change unto being exactly as your
non-being changes into non-being ?
Lord : Yes
Gautama ! That is exactly so.
The above
dialogue clearly defines Lord Mahavira's assertion of the concomitance of being and
non-being in the same entity as also their distinct causal identities.
Lord Mahavira
rejected both the propositions viz. everything exists (sarvam asti) and nothing exists
(sarvam nasti ). He proposed a synthesis of the two. Both being and non-being are true.
They are distinct, though predicable of the same entity. The distinctness of the two is
unambiguously demonstrated in the following words of Gautama addressed to the upholders of
heterodox doctrines. 'We never, O beloved of gods ! speak of being as non-being and
non-being as being. We affirm being of the concept 'everything exists' (Sarvamasti)
and non-being of the proposition 'nothing exists' (sarvam nasti). The implication is that
being is true as being and non-being is true as non-being. In other words, being and
non-being are both real. It is interesting to note here it is exactly these two
propositions which were advanced by two rival Buddhist schools viz., the sarvastivadins
and the Madhyamika sunyavsdins.
The
implication of the above dialogue is the rejection of absolute being and absolute
non-being, and acceptance of the synthesis of the two as concrete aspects of an entity.
Being and non-being are also explained as possessed of their definite place and value in
the above dialogue.
The Concomitance of the permanent and the Impermanent
'Is it true, O Lord !'
, asked Gautama, 'that the unstable changes while the stable does not change, the unstable
breaks whereas the stable does not break ?'
'Yes, Gautama
! This is exactly so.'
A substance is
the co-existence of the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and the unstable. It is
immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never changes into
non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various forms of existence.
This is explained in the following dialogue between Manditaputra and the Lord.
Manditapura :
'Is it true, O Lord ! that the soul is constantly subject to wavering and as a result it
passes
through various states ?'
Lord : Yes,
Manditaputra ! This is true.'
The same has
been said to be true of a material atom which has been regarded as an ever-changing entity
in Jainism.
The permanence
of the substance is due to its unwavering character (the attribute of immutability), while
its impermanence is due to its wavering character (origination and cessation). This is
manifest from the following dialogue:-
Gautama : 'Is
the soul permanent or impermanent, O Lord ?'
Lord : 'The
soul is permanent in some respect and impermanent in another respect. It is permanent in
respect of its substance (which is eternal) and it is impermanent in respect of modes
which originate and vanish'
This is true
not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent
nor impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent.
The Concomitance of Identity and Difference of substance and Modes
'knowledge is the
defining characteristic of a soul'. Here the soul-substance and the knowledge-quality are
given from the stand-point of difference. On the other hand, it has also been said that
what is designated as the soul is the knower, or conversely what is designated as the
knower is the soul. Such Agamic text assert the identity of soul and knowledge.
The earth is a
substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced
without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of
holding water, before it is transformed into a pot which, therefore, is functionally
different from earth. A pot is a product and earth is its material cause; in other words
earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and
its mode is identity-cum-difference. It, therefore, follows that an effect and a cause are
related through identity-cum-difference.
The Concomitance of One and Many
There are dialogues
which throw light on the concomitance of one and many. The following dialogue is an
illustration in point :-
Somila : 'Are
you one or many, O Lord ?'
Lord : I am
one in respect of substance, O somila, However, in respect of knowledge and intuition I am
two. In respect of parts (constituents of a substance ) I am immutable, eternal and
unchanging. I am many in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness.
The nature of
the substance and modes entails the relationship of one and many, universal and
particular, permanent and impermanent. The substance is one while the modes are many. The
substance stands for the universal and the modes for the particular. The substance is
eternal while the modes are changeable.
The universal
is two-fold-- the horizontal (tiryag) and the vertical (urdhva) The proposition 'I am
one', refers to the horizontal universal which is the experience of unity (ekatva),
persuasiveness (anvaya) and essence (dhruvatva). The proposition ;I am many', in respect
of the successive functions of my consciousness represents the vertical universal. There
is the experience of before and after in it. The horizontal universal is the essence
prevading through the different contemporary states, which establishes their unity. The
vertical universal consists in the successive changes that are similar, which establishes
a unity running through the past, present and future.
We find
elaborate investigation into the nature of non-absolutism and the doctrine of relativism
in the Agamic literature. The dictum- no word of the jina is independent of naya (a
particular viewpoint) is the reputed principal of Agamic exegesis. Each proposition of the
Agama was explained by means of the nayas. The tradition says that the Drstivada,
the twelfth text of the basic scripture, contained philosophical discussions based on
different viewpoints. By the third century B.C. the main part of the text was lost,
leaving behind only a fragment of it. Vacaka Umasvati and Acharya Siddhasena were the
pioneers in the application of the nayas to the different philosophical problems of their
times and Acharya Samantabhadra carried this process to its consummation by including a
good number of new issues that had cropped up by his time. Siddhasena clearly demonstrated
that the Samkhya systems illustrated the substantial standpoints whereas the Buddhist
philosophy is a representative of the model viewpoint. In this way he made an evaluation
of all the systems of thought that were extant, from the relativistic standpoint, with
reference to different nayas. The most important treatise of his on the subject is the
Sanmati Tarka, while the most significant work of Samantabhadra on this subject is the
Apta-Mimamsa, in which he has most successfully been able to apply the principle of
sevenfold predication to the current problems of universal and particular, identity and
difference, existence and non-existence and such other mutually opposed doctrines to
establish a synthesis between them. Both these treatises can be regarded as pioneer works
of the philosophy of non-absolutism.
Non-absolutism : Results and problems
The philosophical speculations based on the non-absolutistic attitude gradually gained in depth. By the eighth century AD. Acharya Haribhadra and Akalanka further widened its scope. Acharya Haribhadra's Anekantajayapataka bears self-evident testimony to this process. The synthetic approach had also an uninterrupted growth. A serious doubt, however, presented itself. The question arose as to whether Jaina philosophy is a mere syncretistic eclectic movement or it had its own original thinking. Some modern scholars also adopt this line of thinking and are convinced that the jaina thinkers developed their own philosophy by appropriating alien doctrines. Such thought owes its origin to the synthetic approach of the Jains to philosophical problems. Vacaka Umasvati raises the question whether the nayas are the proponents of alien philosophies or independent upholders of opposition inspired by diverse opinions and answers that they are only different estimates (literally, concepts derived from different angles of vision) of the object known. Yathava pratyaksanumanopamanaptavacanaih Pranamaireko rthah pramiyate svavisayaniyamat, na ca ta vipratipattaya bhavanti tadvad nayavada iti. It is also asserted in this connection the three is no contradiction between them, just as there is none between different instruments of knowledge, such as perception, inference, comparison and the words of a reliable person.
The Doctrine Of Conditional Dialectics And Sevenfold Predication.
The expression Syadvada (conditional dialectics)
is composed of two words, viz. 'Syat' and 'Verde'. 'Sat' is
an indeclinable that appears like a verbal form in the potential mood. It stands for
multiplicity, obligation, reasoning etc. But in the present context it stands for
multiplicity or multiple character (anekanta). The term is also used to denote particular
space and time, as well as probability (sambhavana) and doubt. The word Syat in the
expression syadvada has not been used to mean doubt . It is used to denote multiplicity or
multiple character (anekanta). The implication is that syadvada is the doctrine of the
multiple character of real. It is a doctrine that is known as Anekanta or the
non-absolutistic estimation of reality in its infinitely multiple character. This
non-absolutistic estimation is definite in its character and free from all doubts as
indicated by the expression syat which is absolutely free from any kind of association,
direct or indirect, with the verbal form syat used in the potential mood of sanskrit
conjugation of verbal roots. Probability (sambhavana) and relativity, however, are implied
by the word 'syat'
The word 'syat
is necessary for the affirmation of the desired attribute to the exclusion of the
undesired one. And this is why all the propositions, in order to be precise in meaning,
should be accompanied by the use of the word 'syat'. The propositions without such express
use of 'syat' should be understood to have that word implicitly. The word 'syat has a
double implication:
(1) Negation without affirmation of affirmation without
negation is not possible
(2) The generic attribute (continuity or the universal)
and the specific attribute ( origination, cessation or the
particular) - both these are relative. We never
experience origination-cessation without continuity or the latter
without the former.
The nature of
a real is not omnigeneous and so it exist in its own nature and does not exist in the
nature of alien things, or , to be more exact, a real exist in its present mode and does
not exist in its modes that have passed away or will come in the future
The cycle of
origination and cessation goes on uninterrupted. The mode that arises is the affirmation,
whereas the mode that has passed away or is yet to arise is the negation of the object.
Affirmation and negation
are thus simultaneous moments or the real.
A sensuous
cognition of an object is positive in character and never negative according to some
thinkers.
The inference (anumana) is, however, positive and
negative both. According to the conditional dialectics (syadvada) affirmation and negation
are the attributes of the real. We perceive fire and the affirmation in this case means
that the fire exist in a particular place. when we try to infer fire from smoke, the
existence of smoke proves the existence of fire in a particular place while the existence
of a contradictory probans ( hetu) proves the non-existence of fire. But the
affirmation or the negation in the conditional dialectics is not related to space or time
of the object. They are related to determination of the nature of the object. The fire in
a particular place or time exist in its own nature, that is, its affirmation is dependent
on its constituents and its denial is dependent on the element that do not constitute its
character. Affirmation and negation are coexistence in an object. On account of its
positive character a thing is existent in its own nature, while on account of its negative
aspects it is not mixed up with what is other than it self. In other words, the nature of
an object is definite on account of its self affirmation and negation of alien elements.
This is indeed the reality of the real. The word 'syat' defines this definiteness of the
nature of an object.
The
conditional dialectics (syadvada) is also known as the exposition by the division (
vibhajyavada) or the doctrine of alternative (bhajanavada). This follows from the
following exhortation of Lord Mahavira: 'A monk should take resort to the doctrine of
exposition by division (vibhajyavada) ; he should utilize all possible all alternatives
and should never adhere to an absolutistic attitude in explaining the nature of a thing. '
The Lord himself explain many a problem by means of this method of division.
Once Jayanti
asked the Lord which was better between the states os slumber and awakening.
'For some
souls, O Jayanti! the slumber is commendable, but for others awakening is wholesome.'
'Why is it so,
O Lord!?'
'The slumber
is wholesome for those who are engaged in sinful activities, while for the virtuous
awakening is a commendable.'
The exclusive
assertion of the wholesomeness of slumber or awakening would be an absolutistic answer
which was not approved by Lord Mahavira who explained all the questions by means of
division of issues avoiding exclusiveness.
If the
identity of the substance and the attributes is accepted, both will merge into each other,
loosing their duality, and as a consequence the proposition 'the attribute subsists in a
substance' would be impossible.
If, again, the
attribute were absolutely different from the substance, the proposition ' this
attribute belong to this substance' would be impossible, because in the absence of some
sort of identity the proposition would be meaningless. According to the doctrine of
alternatives (bhajanavada) the rule of exclusiveness of identity or difference cannot be
acceptable. The doctrine of alternatives (bhajanavada) approves of both identity and
difference. The adjective substantive relationship between the substance attribute would
be impossible if there were absolute identity between them. 'A man with a beard is
coming', in this proposition the expression 'with a beard' is the adjective of the
expression 'man' which is the substantive. The adjective must be in some respect different
from the substantive, and this is why the substantive-adjective relationship does not
offer any logical inconsistency in accepting the relationship of identity -cum-difference
between the substance and its attributes.
There is no
contradiction between the positum and the negatum. This is the implication or
pre-supposition of the doctrine of conditional dialectics (syadvada). The duality of
apparently contrary attributes enjoy mutual concomitance. It is on this finding that the
doctrine of non-absolutism (anekantavada) as a synthesis of infinite number of such
dualities established. The conditional dialectic (syadvada) is, in essence, the system of
propositions expressing such multiple character of the real. In these propositions
affirmation, negation and such other alternatives define the nature of the real. This can
be demonstrated by the doctrine of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi) which is as
follows:
1. The pot certainly (eva) exists
in some respect (syat).
2. The pot certainly (eva) does
not exists in some respect (syat).
3. The pot certainly (eva) exists
and does not exists in some respect (syat).
4. The pot is certainly (eva)
indescribable is some respect (syat).
5. The pot certainly (eva) exists
and is indescribable in some respect (syat).
6. The pot certainly (eva) does
not exist and is indescribable in some respect (syat).
7. The pot certainly (eva)
exists, certainly does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (syat).
It represents
the existence of the pot, relegating the other attributes to a secondary position by
excluding them from the intended area of reference.
The expression
'eva' (certainly) in the above propositions indicates the definite character of the
assertion or the negation indescribability or their possible combinations. Sometimes it is
suggested that the expression 'also' (api) should be substituted for the expression
'certainly' (eva) in the above propositions. But such substitution would not carry much
meaning. Without the use of the expression 'certainly' (eva) the intended attributes
(existence, non-existence etc.) would not be definitely determined. In the absence of
relativism indicated by the phrase 'in some respect' (syat) the use of the expression
'certainly' (eva) would confer an absolutistic import on the propositions. But by the use
of the word 'syat' (in some respect) indicative of relativism, the expression 'certainly'
(eva) loses the absolutistic import and confers definiteness on the intended
attributes predicated in the propositions.
The expression
'eva' (exclusively) is used to serve three purposes-
1. The exclusion of
non-relationship. (ayogavyavaccheda)
2. The exclusion of the
relationship with other (anyayogavyavaccheda)
3. The exclusion of absolute
non-relationship (anyayogavyavaccheda)
In the
proposition 'the conch is while exclusively' there is the exclusion of non-relationship.
The expression 'eva' (exclusively) is attached to the adjective. When the whiteness of the
conch is under query, the assertion is made that the conch is white exclusively.
In the
proposition ;partha alone is the archer', the exclusion of archership from any person
other than partha (Arjuna) is intended. Nobody is in doubt about the archership of partha,
but the use of the expression 'exclusively' (eva) is used to set at rest the common doubt
as to whether there is any other person equal to partha in the art of archery.
In the
proposition 'a blue louts certainly exists', the absolute non-relationship (between a
lotus and blueness) is excluded. In this proposition 'certainly' (eva) is attached to the
verb 'exists' in order to exclude the doubt about the affirmation of universal existence
or absolute non-existence (of blueness in the lotus).
In the
proposition 'the pot certainly exists in some respect', the word 'pot is the substantive
and the word 'exists' is the adjective. The word 'certainly' (eva) is connected with the
adjective (viz. asti) and determines the attribute of existence of the pot. If the phrase
'in some respect' (syat) were not used in the proposition, the admission of
absolute existence would be the result, which was not desirable, because there are also
attributes other than existence in the pot. The use of the expression 'syat' (in
some respect) precludes such undesirable consequences. It also widens the limits imposed
by the expression 'eva' (certainly). The unambiguous assertion of the intended
attribute and the comprehension of many an unmentioned attribute are effected by the joint
use of words 'syat' and 'eva'.
In the
doctrine of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi) affirmation and negation of the
predicate are respectively made in the first two propositions, the predominant features in
the first being position and in the second negation. The attribute verbally mentioned is
evidently predominant, while the attribute not so mentioned, but only understood, is
secondary and subordinate.
A thing is not
absolutely devoid of it's own nature and so it is described by means of affirmation as
predominant character nor is it omnigenous and so it is described by means of negation as
a predominant factor. Negation is as much an attribute of a thing as affirmation. A pot
has existence in respect of it's own substance. This is affirmation. The pot has
non-existence in respect of an alien substance. This is negation. Apparently thus the
negation is a relative mode, that is, a mode with reference to another thing. But truly
speaking this is not so. Negation is an intrinsic potency of a thing. A substance, if it
were exclusively possessed of the attribute of existence bereft of non-existence, would
not be able to preserve it's substancehood. Negation is a predicted with reference to
other things so it is called relative or 'dependent on others'. The negation acts as a
protecting shield by not allowing the encroachment of alien existence. A pot exists in
respect of it's own substance and does not exist in respect of an alien substance - both
these propositions revel the truth that the pot is a relative entity, as much dependent on
itself as on others for it's definite nature. This relativism falsifies either of the
propositions, viz. the moment of existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence or that
the moment of non-existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence. Existence and
non-existence (affirmation and negation) are simultaneous. But this simultaneity is
incapable of being expressed by a single word at a single moment. This is why a third
proposition is requisitioned for expressing the simultaneity of existence and
non-existence through the expression 'indescribable' (avaktavya). The implication is that
the existence and non-existence are necessarily co-existent, but they are unspeakable
simultaneously by a single expression on account of the absence of any linguistic symbol
capable of discharging this ambivalent function.
It would
follow from the above that there are only three fundamental predicable, viz. existent,
non-existent and indescribable. The remaining four predicables are but the different
combination of these three taken two or three at a time. In the Agamic period the use of
three predicables was mostly in vogue. The use of the seven predicables is also found in
some cases.
Once Gautama
asked Lord Mahariva-'O Lord! is a two spaced aggregate self, not-self or indescribable?'
Lord replied -
'O Gautama! a two spaced aggregate is self in some respect, not-self in some respect and
indescribable in some respect.'
Gautama said -
'How is it so, O Lord!?'
Mahavira
replied - 'O Gautama! It is self in respect of its own nature, it is not- self in respect
of alien nature and it is indescribable in respect of both.'
Four
additional predicable follows spontaneously, viz.-
1. A two spaced aggregate is self in
some respect, is not self in some respect.
2. A two spaced aggregate is self in
some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
3. A two spaced aggregate is not-self
in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
The seventh
predicable follows in respect of a three spaced aggregate-
4. A three spaced aggregate is self in
some respect, is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
A thing is
positive and negative rolled into one. The doctrine of sevenfold predication has been
framed on the basis of this dual attribute of position and negation. The dualities of
universal particular, permanent-impermanent, describable-indescribable can also constitute
this system of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi). Each of these dualites can be used as
the predicates of the seven proposition. Three proposition constituted by these duals are
given below by way of illustration. It should be noted here that the Jaina philosopher's
conception of universal is quite different from that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. The
Jains substitute similarity for universal_
1. The pot certainly is similar in some
respect.
The pot
certainly is different in some respect.
The pot
certainly is indescribable in some respect.
2. The pot certainly is permanent in
some respect.
The pot
certainly is impermanent in some respect
The pot
certainly is indescribable in some respect.
3. The pot certainly is speakable in
some respect.
The pot
certainly is unspeakable in some respect.
The pot
certainly is indescribable in some respect.
Each attribute
of an object can give rise to a system of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi). Permanence
and impermanence being mutually contradictory attributes, how could they qualify the same
pot. It is on the basis of relativism that a synthesis is established between these
mutually opposed attributes.
The Greek
poet-philosopher Heraclitus of the 6th -5th century B.C believed in the doctrine of the
co-existence of contraries. His relativism is the spur which pricks the side of a sluggish
conservatism in all departments of life-taste and morals, politics and society- and it is
the absence of relativism that, according to Heraclitus, is responsible for absolutisms
and stagnation in philosophical thinking. Heraclitus announced for the first time in Greek
thought the principle of relativity of qualities which he pushed forthwith to its extreme
consequences in the words 'good and bad are the same', 'we are and we are not'. The
movement of life, according to him, is like the back-returning of the bow, to which he
compares it, an energy of traction and tension restraining an energy of release, every
force of action compensated by a corresponding force of reaction. By the resistance of one
to the other all the harmonies of existence are created.
Heraclitus was
a fluxist and, therefore, a relativist. In point of fact his doctrine of flux and his
doctrine of relativity lead to the same result; the successive states of an object as well
as its simultaneous qualities frequently both the stamp of a far-reaching diversity which
amounts at complete contradiction. In one aspect, according to him, X is 'good', in
another aspect it is 'bad'. He believed in a fundamental law in the natural as well as the
spiritual world that contraries were not mutually exclusive, but rather pre-supposed and
conditional, or were even identical with each other. His theory of relativity contained
like a folded flower the correct doctrine of sense-perception with its recognition of the
subjective factor, and it taught Greek thinkers the lesson they were bound to acquire if
they were to be saved from a bottomless scepticism.
The relativism
of Heraclitus is based on fluxism. But the basis of relativism of the Jaina philosopher is
quite different, according to whom the momentarines is as much dependent on permanence as
the latter is dependent on the former. Momentariness and permanence both together
constitute the nature of the real. They do not occur in succession but are co-existent and
inseparable. Change or momentarines is only one aspect of the thing and is meaningless
with out its co-ordinate, viz. the permanence. Relativity, in fact, is understandable
on the interdependence of the aspects. viz. momentarines
and permanence, in the absence of which it is unthinkable. It is only on the simultaneous
existence of the two country aspects or attributes relativity acquires a meaning.
Sri Aurobindo
thinks that Heraclitus seems to recognize the inextricable unity of the internal and the
transitory, that which is for ever end yet seem to exist only in this strife and change
which is a continual dying.
If this
estimate is acceptable, the philosophy of Heraclitus would be never to the Jaina
standpoint. But even than the Jaina philosopher would disagree because the transitoriness
and eternality are co-ordinate factors, neither being sub-ordinate to the other, as sri
Aurobindo or the Vedantists would like to believe. Acarya Amrtacandra has brought out the
equipollence of the two contrary attributes by the examples of churning by a milkmaid, who
moves her left and right arm alternately in opposite directions to make butter, thus
exercising both the arms in succession. in the doctrine of conditional dialectics
(syadvada), similarly, of the two contrary attributes one is assigned prominence by
relegating the other to the background at a time. This explains the nature of relativism
or relativity of the Jaina philosopher. None of the attributes is subordinate to the
other, both being active in their own way to discharge their respective functions and
constitute the nature of the real.
The doctrine of conditional dialectics (syadvada) and its results
1. In
the science of logic causality is a universal postulate. But in the conditional dialectic
causality is not a universally applicable principal which is active only in the gross
world. The subtle or the micro-cosmic world is governed by its own rules where the cause
effect relationship becomes too thin to be recognized. The succession of cause and effect
becomes meaningless at that stage. Momentarines changes into smooth passing from one state
to another without any gap. Origination and cessation become meaningless. In the language
of the traditional karma doctrine the causal concatenation can be detected in the
phenomena of the fruition or disappearance of karma. The changes taking place in
the gross atomic aggregates also appear as subject to causality. However, in the changes
that are spontaneous and intrinsic, the principle of causality is not applicable in the
ordinary sense of the term. In jaina ontology it is averred that the colour of an atom
definitely changes after the lapse of a definite period, the cause of such change being
undefined. An atom is here governed by its own intrinsic nature. The instantaneous
modality (artha paryaya) of an atom is beyond the range of the principle of causality. A
substance undergoes intact in the succeeding moment provided the former could mould itself
in consonance with the latter. The nature of the instantaneous mode (artha paryaya)
has found expression in the following traditional verse- Anadinidhane loke, svaparyayah pratiksanam/ utpadyante vipadyante, jalakallolavajjale// 'In the substance, which is
without beginning and without end, the modes arise and vanish by themselves every moment
like the waves that emerge in the ocean without interruption.'
The doctrine
of causality finds proper place and exposition in the pantoscopic, analytic and momentary
viewpoints (that take note of the prolonged mode.)
The doctrine
of causality assumes quite a different meaning that is tantamount to its abrogation in the
verbal, etymological and functional viewpoints. An effect arises by its own nature
spontaneously according to these viewpoints. An effect cannot depend on anything else for
its origination. It is meaningless to say that a self created object has a cause that is a
something other than itself. When the cause and effect are identical, it is redundant to
assert a relationship tertium quid between the two. It follows, therefore, that an effect
arises spontaneously and intrinsically from and by itself independent of anything outside
it.
2. The
existence of mode is made subordinate and ignored in the purely substantial viewpoint
(suddha dravyarthika-naya), and therefore the division of time into the past, Future and
present do not exist, The three verbal viewpoint (sabda-nayas), being concerned with
'becoming, accept modes and, therefore, there division of time are real according to them.
The implication is that the unchanging aspect of the substance is timeless, the
instantaneous mode being just momentary is also virtually timeless. It is only the verbal
or conceptual mode (vyanjana-paryya) that depends on the division of time, being a sort of
prolonged existence. The substance in its three aspects virtually represents three
different systems of philosophy, viz. the monistic Vedanta that believes in absolutely
unchanging Brahma, the Buddist fluxism that adumbrates unceasing change and
Nyaya-vaisesika that believes in both permanence and change.
3. The
substance consists in modes that are successive and non-successive. Such modes exist in
the present in the aspects as intendent or known by the cogniser, but do not exist
in those aspects in the other division of time. This differentiation of aspect owing to
the condition of time is matched by a similar differentiation on account of other causes
and conditions as well. A novel system of sevenfold predication of the conditional
dialectic (syadvada) can be conceived on this variety of causes and conditions, viz.
1. The Substance is one.-
2. It exists in some respect.
3. It has an originating condition.
4. It has a source of origin.
5. It is also related to
something else.
6. It also has a location.
7. It has also a time.
Among the
modes that occur in succession it is only the present one that is definite, whereas the
modes that are to come are not regulated by any rule regarding their probability and
indefinite occurrence. It is not possible to predict definite could necessarily occur in
succession of a particular mode. In this quantum mechanics according to which it is
impossible to assert in terms of the ordinary conventions of geometrical position and of
motion that a particle (as an electron) is at the same time at a specified point and
moving with a specified velocity, for the more accurately either factor can be measured,
the less accurately the other can be asserted.
4. The doctrine of conditional
dialectic (syadvada) is applicable not only for the explanation of spatial, temporal and
quantitative relative modes, but it can be validly applied for ascertaining the intrinsic
modes of the substance. Permanence and impermanence are the intrinsic modes which appear
as contraries in the gross world. These are not contrary in essence and, therefore, their
contrariety can be solved by relativity.
5. In the context of the doctrine of
conditional dialectic (syadvada) a study of the relativity of the modern science is very
valuable.
Some expert statisticians have studied
this sevenfold predication of the doctrine of conditional dialectic in the light of the
principles of statistics. We quote here an excerpt from an article of Prof.
P.C.Mahalanobis--
'I should now like to make some brief
observations of my own on the connection between Indian-Jaina views and the foundations of
statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of syadvada,
namely avaktavya or the indeterminate is a synthesis of three earlier categories of (1)
assertion ('it is'), (2) negation ('it is not'), and (3) assertion and negation in
succession. The fourth category of syadvada, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the
qualification of syadvada, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative (but
not quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability. Used in a purely
qualitative, the fourth category of predication in jaina logic corresponds precisely to
the meaning of probability which covers the possibility of (a) Something existing, (b)
Something not-existing, and (c) Sometimes existing and Sometimes
not existing. The difference between jaina 'avakatvya' and
'probability' lies in the fact that the latter ( that is, the concept of probability) has
definite quantitative implications, namely, the recognition of numerical frequencies of
occurrence of (1) 'it is', or (2) 'it is not', and hence in the recognition of
relative numerical frequencies of the first two categories of 'it is' and 'it is
not' in a synthetic form. It is the explicit recognition of (and emphasis on) the concept of numerical frequency ratios which
distinguishes modern statistical theory from the jaina theory of syadvada. At the same
time it is of interest to not that 1500 or 2000 years ago syadvada seems to have given the
logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.
Secondly, I
should like to draw attention to the jaina view that 'a real is a particular which
possesses a generic attributes'. This is a very close concept of an individual in relation
to the population to which it belongs. The jaina view, in fact, denies the possibility of
making any predication about a single and unique individual which would be true in modern
statistical theory.
The third
point to be noted is the emphasis given in jaina philosophy on the related of things and
on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to b similar (again in a purely qualitative
sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concept of association, correlation and
concomitant variation in modern statistics.
The jaina view
of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristics of all that
is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and
relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning. 'A real changes every
moment and at the same time continues , is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the
underlying idea of stochastic processes.
Fifthly the
most important feature of jaina logic is its instance on the impossibility of absolutely
certain predication and its emphasis on non- absolutist and relativist predication. In
syadvada the qualification 'syat' that is 'may be or perhaps' must be attached to every
predication, according to syadvada, thus, has a margin of uncertainty which is somewhat
similar to the concept of 'uncertain inference' in modern statistical theory. The jaina
view, however, is essentially qualitative in this manner ( while the great characteristics
of modern statistical theory is insistence on the possibility and significance of
determining the margin of uncertainty in a meaningful way). The rejection of absolutely
certain predication naturally leads to jaina philosophy continually to emphasize the
inadequacy of 'pure' or 'informal' logic, and hence to stress the need of making
inferences on the basis of data supplied by experience.
I should also
like to point out that the jaina view of causality as 'a relation of determination' based
on the observation of 'concomitance in agreement and in difference' has dual reference to
an internal condition 'in the developed state of our mind' which would seem to correspond
to the state of organized knowledge in any given context and also to an external condition
based on the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events' which is suggestive
of a statistical approach.
Finally, I
should draw attention to the realist and pluralist views of jaina philosophy and the
continuing emphasis on the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality which
amounts to the acceptance of an 'open' view of the universe with scope for unending change
and discovery. For reasons explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian Jaina
philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view
of reality in modern times.
Dialogue.
Question 1. How can syat mean 'in some respect' ? Is it not a verbal form in the potential mood?
Answer. Just as the expression 'asti' in the sentence 'the world is
inhabited by the heroes' (astivira vasundhara), is an indeclinable (nipata), exactly so in
the expression 'syatvada' the word 'syst' is an indeclinable. It is not used to denote the
potential mood. It
is possessed of many senses, one of them
being 'in some respect.'
Question 2. Both the sentient and the non-sentient are
possessed of infinite number of attributes. What, then, is the line of demarcation
between them, when it has been virtually asserted that everything has the nature of
everything-a proposition which
expresses the universal property of a real (both
sentient and nonsentient)?
Answer. The attributes are of two kinds - generic and specific. By the
specific attributes a substance is defined in its independent and discrete aspect.
Sentience is one such specific attribute which belongs to the substance that
is sentient and not to what is non-sentient. From the viewpoint of the
attribute 'sentience' there is absolute difference between the sentient and
non-sentient. And this is why the sentient and the non-sentient are absolutely different
substances. Every substance is possessed
of infinite number of attributes. All the
substances have their own separate identities due to their uncommon properties
and so the samkhya-yoga dictum that 'every things is possessed of the nature
of everything (sarvam sarvatmakam)' is not acceptable to Jainas, who do
not admit the evolution of the physical cosmos from the single principle of prakrti
(primordial matter).
The existence of sentience in a sentient being is natural and independent of
anything else. In the non-sentient material particle or body there are attributes
that are natural and intrinsic ,viz. .colour, smell, taste and touch. All attributes,
momentary or durable, originating from the combination of modes that are intrinsic
as well as extrinsic.
Question 3. The Naiyayikas and others also define the nature of an object by means of a determining characteristic, just as in the system of conditional dialectic (syadvada) the nature of the real is determined by a specific attribute. What, then, is the difference between the two philosophies, as both of them admit a real as independent of anything else so far as its own nature is concerned? There must be a point of departure between the two which should characterize the Jaina thinker's standpoint as the proponent of relativity as implied in the conditional dialectic (syadvada).
Answer . In the proposition 'the soul certainly exists in some respect',
that is, in its aspect of sentience, the existence of sentience is affirmed ; that
does not mean that existence alone is its own characteristic, but that non-existence also
is an equally valid aspect of it. Here the question may arise that if the
extraneous non-existence is a nature of the soul, then the colour etc. of
physical objects should also be considered as the nature
of the latter. The solution is obvious. That both existence and non-existence constitute
the nature of a thing is attested by experience, just as smoke and fire exist in the
same locus, say a kitchen. Existence and non-existence are similarly concomitant
attributes, there being a nature relationship (svabhava-sambandha) between the two. This
in essence is the principle of relativity propounded by the doctrine of conditional
dialectic (syadvada).
The nature of the substance does not follow from the doctrine of conditional
dialectic. The substance is as it is by nature. One cannot explain why that is so.
Philosophy does not create a real. It only explains it. And exactly this
is the aim and purpose of conditional dialectic. The Jaina philosopher admits five special
qualities on the basis of experience which are responsible for the postulation of
five substances
| QUALITY | SUBSTANCE |
| 1. Motion | Dharmastikaya (the substance which is the media of motion) |
| 2. Rest | Adharmastikaya (the substance which is the medium of rest) |
| 3. Accommodation | Akasastikaya- Space (the substance which is the medium
of accommodation). |
| 4. Colour, smell, taste and touch | Matter |
| 5. Consciousness | Soul |
(We have not translated the word 'astikaya' in the above renderings. The above substance are called 'astikaya' because they have extension and are conceived as consisting of space-point, countable, countless or infinite.)
Answer. Acarya Samantabhadra has explained non-absolutism (relativism) from the non-absolutistic standpoint itself. When the system of conditional dialectic is applied for the knowledge and exposition of an object in its entirety, non-absolutism (relativism) is proper and genuine. And when only a particular attribute is cognised and explained, the services of a particular naya (viewpoint) is requisitioned and that is a sort of absolutism, ekanta (singular viewpoint). The propounder of non-absolutism (relativism) admits both non-absolutism and absolutism in their proper perspective. This is why the system of sevenfold predication (sapatabhangi) is applicable to non-absolutism (relativism) itself in the following manner.
1. There is absolutism in some respect.
2. There is non-absolutism in some
respect.
3. There are both absolutism and
non-absolutism in some respect.
4. There is indescribability in some
respect.
5. There is absolutism and
indescribability in some respect.
6. There is non-absolutism and
indescribability in some respect.
7. There is absolutism, non-absolutism
and indescribability in some respect.
There is no
contradiction in absolutism by itself. What is denied is only the absolutism that refutes
the contrary viewpoint. absolutism thus is twofold, viz. right and wrong. The absolutism
that is right is naya, while the wrong one is pseudo-naya. Non-absolutism is not an
obstinate and rigid doctrine because the admission of the co-existence of contrary
attributes not attested by any valid source of knowledge does not fall with in the purview
of genuine non-absolutism. Thus non-absolutism is of two kinds, viz. right and wrong. The
former is valid knowledge, while the latter is a sham simulation of it. The right
non-absolutism has a universal application.
Acarya
Akalanka has subjected the substance 'jiva' to the system of sevenfold predication as
follows-
*The soul
exists (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.
*The soul does
not exist (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.
The
implication of the above two propositions is that the soul is a conscious substance only
so far as its activity of consciousness is concerned. But it has also other aspects, such
as the aspect of being a cognitum or an agent of will, and so on, which are the attributes
that are not opposed to reason and logic are the subject-matter of the doctrine of
non-absolutism.
Question 5. Is relativity itself subject to the system of
sevenfold predication? If so, the admission of an absolutistic truth would be inevitable.
Answer. An object is relative in some respect and non-relative (absolute) in another. Both these alternatives may be acceptable. From the standpoint of the instantaneous or spontaneous mode (artha-paryaya) a thing is absolutely independent of anything else. The substance of space is nothing but space from the standpoint of its instantaneous mode (artha-paryaya). A thing is a relative reality from the standpoint of extraneous and alien modes. Viewed from the standpoint of relativity the same substance of space is perceived as circumscribed by a jar or a canvas, etc. All the prolonged modes (vyanjana-paryaya) are relative aspects. There is not a single element in the cosmos that may be described as independent of anything else. But every substance is a synthesis of the absolute and the relative, which can never be absolutely disconnected, Such disconnection itself can be effected only relatively. The modes are intertwined and can never be disentangled, though the instantaneous mode (artha-paryaya) can be called independent in contradistinction to the prolonged modes (vyanjana-paryana) that are relative.
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