Jains philsophy

We can know the truth and also express it. It consists in the trio of entity, word and knowledge. Different philosophies have looked at the problem from different angles of vision. The vedanta has explained the problem from three standpoints - the ultimate, the empirical and the apparent. The Brahman is the ultimate truth, while the sensuous world has only empirical validity. The cognition of the 'will' the wisp and dream is pure appearance. In Hinayana Buddhism the truth is twofold, viz. the ultimate and the conventional, while in the idealist Buddhism it is threefold, viz. the ultimate (parinispanna), the dependent (paratantra) and the imaginary (parikalpita). The self nature (momentarines) of the object is the ultimate truth. The universal nature is only a conventional truth on account os its being a product os the intellectual function os exclusion.
Different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The foundation stone of such presentation is twofold - intuitive experience and rational knowledge. In intuitive experience the object is know directly and, therefore, there is no difference in such experience. The rational knowledge that occurs at the sensual levels does not congas the object directly and this is the reason why there are varieties in such cognition's. The Vedanta rejected the modes as unreal while accepting the substance alone as ultimately true. The Buddhist, on the other hand, rejected the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of the modes. According to Gain logic, both the substance alone as ultimately true. When the substance hidden under the waves of modes has no appeal, the modes come up prominently at the cost of the substance which lies submerged under them. When the mode, like waves, lose their identity in the calmness of the unfathomed ocean of substance, the latter alone appears to be ultimately real. The Vedantic monism is like the waveless ocean and the Buddhist phenomenalism is the ocean agitated by waves. Non- absolutism appropriates hem both, as so finely expressed in the following beautiful imagery - Aparyayam vastu samasyamanama - dravyametacca vivicyamanam/ Adesabhedoditasaptabhanga- madidrsastvam budharupavedyam

        From the synthetic viewpoint the object is without modes and from the analytic standpoint it is unsubstantial. "You have realized, Oh Lord, the truth in its sevenfold aspects on account of sevenfold view-points, that reveals itself only to the Wise."
        The substance presents itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach is analytical, the modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative period of anekanta some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that constituted an epoch making achievements of that age.
        The first axiom of non absolution is the concomitance of the universal and the particular. The one without the order is inconceivable. The upshot is that a mode without the substance is as impossible as a substance without a mode. There is no such gap between truth and untruth. There is hardly any line of demarcation between the truth of the concept and the falsity of another. The gap between them, if any, can be understood if one realizes that the particular bereft of universal is as nonsensical as the universal bereft of the particular. Both the concepts, viz. the universal and the particular, are true if they are mutually dependent. One rejecting the order is false, while both are true representatives of their own objects of reference.

The second axion of non absolution is the concomitance of the permanent and the impermanent, the truth of the one is verified by the truth os the other. The materialist thinks that the sensuous world alone is true. There is nothing like the spiritual. The   spiritualist. The spiritualist, on the hand, asserts that it is the self alone that is true, the sensuous world is false. The logicians of the Jain school investigated the truth behind the rival claims and found that the sensuous world was not false. Whatever is possessed of causal efficiency is true. The senses are causally efficient and hence cannot be untrue. Their objects also cannot be false. The characteristic features of a real are origination, cessation and persistence. Whatever is causally efficient does necessarily arise, cease to exist and also continue. To say that the sensuous world is true and the self is untrue can be possible only in ordinary parlour, but it can never be a language expressive os the truth that is deep and unfathomable. On the other hand, to say that the self alone is the ultimate truth while the sensuous world is unadulterated falsehood , can be the language of the spiritual world, but it can never be true of the world as it is. The saints and philosophers cannot express themselves in identical linguistic tools. In spiritual idiom could inspire detachment and renunciation, but would miserably fail as a device of logical investigation of the nature of truth. Logic does not distinguish between the reality of the sensuous object and the reality of the self. The material atoms are as real as the spiritual self in the eyes of the rationalist. All that originates, vanishes and persists is real. This triple criterion of truth is as validly applicable to the material atom as to the spiritual self. When the spiritual values doctrine. All the spiritual thinkers. without any exception have endorsed it The Jainas also have assigned adequate importance to it. Among the twelve ntemplations, impermanent But that belongs to the sphere of spirituality. As soon as one switches to rational thinking, it is the definite view of the jaina philosophers that the discrepancy between the impermanence of the material and the permanence of the spiritual becomes untenable. To the reasoning mind the permanence and the impermanence are equally shared by the spiritual and the material world. A clear line of demarcation can never be drawn between permanence and impermanence. By the admission of such distinction the samkhya system has to assign both bondage and emancipation to Prakrti ( the primordial matter) instead of Purusa of whom two were only metaphorically admissible. The Purusa is eternally free and pure. The admission of bondage and emancipation would make the latter amenable to change and impermanence, a position which could not be acceptable to the Samkhya system.
        Among the Jainas, Acharya Kundakunda has also asserted, like the Samkhya, that the Jiva (the soul) is not the agent of Karma. If the soul were the agent of Karma, he would never be free from it. And it is exactly because he is not the agent, he is capable of getting rid of karma. From the absolute substantial standpoint, it is true that the nature can never change. Consciousness has a specific nature which is conscious. It can never lapse. Self-awareness is its specific function. How could then it be the agent of the karma which is a heterogeneous entity ? This is the standpoint of pure substance, independent of any adventitious adjunct.One can defend the Samkhya's assignment of bondage and emancipation to the prakrti. In the language of Jainism one can similarly say that it is only Karmic body that is subject to bondage and emancipation. From the semi-absolute substantial standpoint one could assert that the Jiva (the soul) is the agent of Karma. The substantial standpoint is concerned exclusively with the universal. The mode sinks into insignificance when the universal is predominant. Permanence is true because a thing not only exists but exists forever. An entity's continuance for long gives an impression of its uninterrupted continuity. When we concentrate on the similar or the identical aspects of a thing, the philosophy of identity, universality or substance presents itself as the only valid alternative. the flow of origination and cessation is going on without interruption. How could one say that the mountain that hi ancestors saw still continues to exist? or the person in front is the same whom he saw yesterday ? The old atoms are constantly giving birth to new ones. a person's atomic physical conglomerate being constantly emitted and replaced by a facsimile. In the absence of such emission the method of the photography of the absent object could never be successful. This movement of atoms proves impermanence of the substance. The successive vision of similar modes gives an impression of impermanence. Under these two diverse situations how should we distinguish between truth of permanence and impermanence? The falsity of the one would entail the truth of the other, which would lead to the controversy that exists between rival camps, each believing in one or the alternative. Non-obsolutism, however does not admit the absolute validity of anyone of these alternative. According to it neither permanence independent of impermanence nor impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth, both being true only relatively. There is no creation , according to Kundakunda, without destruction and no destruction without creation and no creation-cum-destruction without continuity or eternity. The synthesis of the three --creation, destruction and continuity-- is the truth. the instantaneous modality (arthaparyaya) is the mode that is momentary, according to which the mountain or man standing in front cannot be the same as had been seen ten years ago. The prolonged modality (vyanjanaparyaya), on the other hand, is one that continues for an appreciably long time, according to which the mountain or the man standing before is the same as had been seen ten years ago. In instantaneous modality the recognition of similarity is absent while in prolonged modality it is predominant. To deduce impermanence and permanence respectively from dissimilarity is only a truth and not the truth that is ultimate. The dissimilarity in instantaneous modality as well as similarity in prolonged modality are nothing but modes which would entail impermanence. In the unending chain of causality there comes a moment when a mountain or man, as entity, ceases to exist and dissolves in atoms which however, do continue to exist in the eternity of time and space. The soul that infused life in that body does likewise never cease to exist. The condition of permanence is the basic substance. A mode, whether momentary or continuos, dissimilar or similar, does a rule establish impermanence
        The approach or the viewpoint (naya) of universality and permanence it the standpoint of substance (dravyarthika naya) while that of particularity and change as origination-cum-cessation is the stand point of modes (paryayarthika naya) These two are the basic standpoint that are mutually relative. From the relativity of these two are derived the two principles of non - absolutism, viz. identity -cum- difference of the universal and the particular, and the relativity or permances-cum- impermanence.

The third axiom of non -absolutism is the concomitance of existence and non-existence it is some times arguedthat because the surface of are wooden chair is hard, it bears weight because it is soft, an axe can cut through it. And because hardness and softness contracted each other, they cannot co-exist. But as they appear co-exist,both of them are only appearance and not reality. And along with their unreality the wooden chair is unreal. This is not the way of non absolutism, which regards and infinity numbers of mutually opposed attributes as an inalienable part of a real. A real is an integrated whole of infinity number of atributes. It is exactly because those attributes are mutually opposed that a real is a real in the true sense of the term. Opposition in fact is the richness of the real and in the absence of such opposition would be denuded of its reality. It is indeed the intrinsic nature of a real to be possessed of such opposed attributes and if so why should an attempt be made to deny its reality, by getting ourselves entangled in the labyrinth of imaginary contradictions. As Dharmakirtti puts it, who are we to deny what commends itself to the objects themselves ? What should excise our mind is the search for the source of those opposition and the conditions of the synthesis. The philosophy of non-absolutism made such search and found that existence and non-existence go together. Affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation is never possible. Affirmation is as much an attribute of a real as the negation . Existence is affirmation and non-existence is negation. The intrinsic nature of a substance is the source of existence while the extrinsic nature of a substance is the source of non-existence. The substance of earth of which a pot is made is it's own substance. Similarly the pot has it's own space, time, colour and shape. A pot exists with reference to it's own substance, space, time and modes. But it is non-existent as alien substance, space. time and modes. This relative estimation is a principle of synthesis. A pot does not both exist and not exist with reference identical factors of reference. Existence and non-existence as mutually opposed attributes do certainly exist simultaneously in the same object. But the basic conditions of the two (viz. existence and non-existence) are not identical. The principle of relativity points to the way of synthesis and testifies the reality of co-existence.
        Acharya Akalanka has mentioned a no. of reasons for the admission of existence and non-existence. A pot exists with reference to it's own nature, it does not exist with reference to an alien nature. This argument leads us to investigate the meaning of 'own nature and 'alien nature'. Akalanka's reply is - the own nature refers to the things that is responsible for the application of the 'pot concept' and the 'pot word', and what is not amenable to such usage is the alien nature. The affirmation of the own nature and the denial of the alien nature established the reality of a thing. If the alien nature, viz. a piece of cloth, is not excluded from the own nature, viz. the pot, the word 'pot' would be applicable as designation to all things. And inspite of such exclusion, if the own nature of the pot is not cognised, the latter would be a non-entity like a hare's horn.
        The specifically intended pot again passes through a no. of phases. Anyone among these phases is the own nature while the preceding and succeeding phases are it's alien nature.
        An intermediate phase of the independent pot again is constantly subject to growth and decay. Therefore the state of the present moment is the own nature while the past and future states are the alien natures. If the existence of the pot is determinable by the past and future moments, exactly in the fashion of the present moment, then all pots-past, presents and future-should together be existent at any one moment. The same logic will apply to the nature of non-existence. In other words, if a particular non-existence were determinable by all the past and future non-existences in the same fashion as the present non-existence is determined by its own nature, the upshot will be that any particular moment of non-existence is a totality of all non-existences- past, present and future. Existence and non-existence must each have its own nature, in the absence of which they would lose their identity.
        Again the momentary pot has a good many qualities and modes like colour, taste smell, form etc. We know its existence by seeing its colour with our eyes, and in this context the colour is the own nature, while taste etc. of which we are not aware at the moment, are the alien nature. Had taste etc. been the own nature like the colour of the pot, visible at the moment, then the former would be of the nature of colour, on account of being cognised along with the colour by the eye. And as a result the conception of sense, other than the eye, will be a futile imagination.
        Epistemologically viewed, the idea of pot consequent upon the usage of the word 'pot' is the own nature (of pot), while the shape of the pot outside is the alien nature.
        Consciousness has two aspects:
        (1)    The aspect of being a cognition, just like an imageless mirror.
        (2)    The aspects of being possessed of the cognitum, just like a mirror with an image.

        Of these two, the aspects of being possessed of a cognitum is the own nature ( of a pot ). In other words, in the epistemological situation the pot qua the cognitum is the own nature while the cognition itself is the alien nature. The criterion is that the point of focus is the own nature while the other auxiliary conditions of the alien nature. The own nature in it's essence is the object on which our cognition is fixed. Otherwise all things would be indeterminable. Thus if a pot is considered as nothing other than the cognition itself, than all other things like a piece of cloth etc., as cognita would be identical with the pot. Exactly similar consequences will follow if non-existence of a pot is identified with the cognition itself because in that case, non-existence being something indeterminable, the entity called pot would not be amenable to any kind of treatment, ontological or practical.

The fourth axiom of non-absolutism is the concomitance of the speakable and the unspeakable. A substance is possessed of an infinite number of attributes,. It is however, not possible to express in language those infinite number of attributes taking place every moment. Besides, our span of life and also the range of language have their own limitations. A substance is unspeakable on account of this infinitude of the space of a thing. Only one attribute can at best be spoken of in one moment and many in many moments, but never all during any stretch of time. A thing is thus speakable with reference to only a limited no. of it's attributes.

The above four axioms are the foundation of non-absolutism. In the speculative period of Jaina philosophy this tetrad of axioms was fully exploited in the solution of logical problems. The growth and development of the epistemological apparatus also did not detract from the importance of these basic axioms. It was always appreciated that the epistemological apparatus itself needed the services of non-absolutism for its own systematic development. Non-absolutism, in fact, was a most comprehensive principle that determined the nature of Jaina thought in all its branches, social, ethical, psychological, ontological, metaphysical and the like. it was Acharya Siddhasena with whom the application of non-absolutism to the various branches of Jaina thought started. After dealing with the nature of varieties of the valid sources of knowledge, Siddhasena added, at the end of his Nyayavatara, an investigation, into the nature of non-absolutism signifying its unavoidability in every such treatise. Akalanka, Vidyananda, Haribhadra, Manikyanandi, vadideva, Hemacandra and others also discussed the problem of valid knowledge in the light of non-absolutism. The principle of non-absolutism was not in the least adversely affected with the development of the science of logic and epistemology, but its importance was rather enhanced as a criterion of the investigation of the nature of logico-epistemological tools. And as a result the concomitance of being and non-being, one and many etc. was gradually firmly established, and Jaina metaphysics developed with the growth of the logical thought.
There is however, no reason to believe that these axioms of non-absolutism were not effective in the Agamic period. Nor is it a valid assumption that these axioms were discovered in the period of philosophical speculations. The difference, if any, lay in the spheres of the application of these axioms in those two periods. In the Agamic period, the principles were applied mainly in the field of ontology, while in the speculative age it was in demand for the synthesis of philosophical issues of all types.

The following dialogue between Lord Mahavira and his disciple Gautama throws welcome light on the problem.
       Gautama : O Lord ! Does being change into being ? Does non-being change into non-being ?
        Lord : Yes, Gautama ! This is exactly so.
        Gautama : O Lord ! Does this change of being into being and non-being into non-being take place owing to some effort or occur spontaneously ?
        Lord : Gautama ! It is effected by effort and also occurs spontaneously.
        Gautama : O Lord ! Does your non-being change into non-being exactly in the same way as your being changes in to being ? Similarly does your being change unto being exactly as your non-being changes into non-being ?
        Lord : Yes Gautama ! That is exactly so.
        The above dialogue clearly defines Lord Mahavira's assertion of the concomitance of being and non-being in the same entity as also their distinct causal identities.
        Lord Mahavira rejected both the propositions viz. everything exists (sarvam asti) and nothing exists (sarvam nasti ). He proposed a synthesis of the two. Both being and non-being are true. They are distinct, though predicable of the same entity. The distinctness of the two is unambiguously demonstrated in the following words of Gautama addressed to the upholders of heterodox doctrines. 'We never, O beloved of gods ! speak of being as non-being and non-being as being. We affirm being of the concept 'everything exists' (Sarvamasti) and non-being of the proposition 'nothing exists' (sarvam nasti). The implication is that being is true as being and non-being is true as non-being. In other words, being and non-being are both real. It is interesting to note here it is exactly these two propositions which were advanced by two rival Buddhist schools viz., the sarvastivadins and the Madhyamika sunyavsdins.
        The implication of the above dialogue is the rejection of absolute being and absolute non-being, and acceptance of the synthesis of the two as concrete aspects of an entity. Being and non-being are also explained as possessed of their definite place and value in the above dialogue.

'Is it true, O Lord !' , asked Gautama, 'that the unstable changes while the stable does not change, the unstable breaks whereas the stable does not break ?'
        'Yes, Gautama ! This is exactly so.'
        A substance is the co-existence of the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and the unstable. It is immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never changes into non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various forms of existence. This is explained in the following dialogue between Manditaputra and the Lord.
        Manditapura : 'Is it true, O Lord ! that the soul is constantly subject to wavering and as a result it passes
through various states ?'
        Lord : Yes, Manditaputra ! This is true.'
        The same has been said to be true of a material atom which has been regarded as an ever-changing entity in Jainism.
        The permanence of the substance is due to its unwavering character (the attribute of immutability), while its impermanence is due to its wavering character (origination and cessation). This is manifest from the following dialogue:-
        Gautama : 'Is the soul permanent or impermanent, O Lord ?'
        Lord : 'The soul is permanent in some respect and impermanent in another respect. It is permanent in respect of its substance (which is eternal) and it is impermanent in respect of modes which originate and vanish'
        This is true not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent nor impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent.

'Knowledge is the defining characteristic of a soul'. Here the soul-substance and the knowledge-quality are given from the stand-point of difference. On the other hand, it has also been said that what is designated as the soul is the knower, or conversely what is designated as the knower is the soul. Such Agamic text assert the identity of soul and knowledge.
The earth is a substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of holding water, before it is transformed into a pot which, therefore, is functionally different from earth. A pot is a product and earth is its material cause; in other words earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and its mode is identity-cum-difference. It, therefore, follows that an effect and a cause are related through identity-cum-difference.

There are dialogues which throw light on the concomitance of one and many. The following dialogue is an illustration in point :-
        Somila : 'Are you one or many, O Lord ?'
        Lord : I am one in respect of substance, O somila, However, in respect of knowledge and intuition I am two. In respect of parts (constituents of a substance ) I am immutable, eternal and unchanging. I am many in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness.
        The nature of the substance and modes entails the relationship of one and many, universal and particular, permanent and impermanent. The substance is one while the modes are many. The substance stands for the universal and the modes for the particular. The substance is eternal while the modes are changeable.
        The universal is two-fold-- the horizontal (tiryag) and the vertical (urdhva) The proposition 'I am one', refers to the horizontal universal which is the experience of unity (ekatva), persuasiveness (anvaya) and essence (dhruvatva). The proposition ;I am many', in respect of the successive functions of my consciousness represents the vertical universal. There is the experience of before and after in it. The horizontal universal is the essence prevading through the different contemporary states, which establishes their unity. The vertical universal consists in the successive changes that are similar, which establishes a unity running through the past, present and future.
        We find elaborate investigation into the nature of non-absolutism and the doctrine of relativism in the Agamic literature. The dictum- no word of the jina is independent of naya (a particular viewpoint) is the reputed principal of Agamic exegesis. Each proposition of the Agama was explained by means of the nayas. The tradition says that the Drstivada, the twelfth text of the basic scripture, contained philosophical discussions based on different viewpoints. By the third century B.C. the main part of the text was lost, leaving behind only a fragment of it. Vacaka Umasvati and Acharya Siddhasena were the pioneers in the application of the nayas to the different philosophical problems of their times and Acharya Samantabhadra carried this process to its consummation by including a good number of new issues that had cropped up by his time. Siddhasena clearly demonstrated that the Samkhya systems illustrated the substantial standpoints whereas the Buddhist philosophy is a representative of the model viewpoint. In this way he made an evaluation of all the systems of thought that were extant, from the relativistic standpoint, with reference to different nayas. The most important treatise of his on the subject is the Sanmati Tarka, while the most significant work of Samantabhadra on this subject is the Apta-Mimamsa, in which he has most successfully been able to apply the principle of sevenfold predication to the current problems of universal and particular, identity and difference, existence and non-existence and such other mutually opposed doctrines to establish a synthesis between them. Both these treatises can be regarded as pioneer works of the philosophy of non-absolutism.

The philosophical speculations based on the non-absolutistic attitude gradually gained in depth. By the eighth century AD. Acharya Haribhadra and Akalanka further widened its scope. Acharya Haribhadra's Anekantajayapataka bears self-evident testimony to this process. The synthetic approach had also an uninterrupted growth. A serious doubt, however, presented itself. The question arose as to whether Jaina philosophy is a mere syncretistic eclectic movement or it had its own original thinking. Some modern scholars also adopt this line of thinking and are convinced that the jaina thinkers developed their own philosophy by appropriating alien doctrines. Such thought owes its origin to the synthetic approach of the Jains to philosophical problems. Vacaka Umasvati raises the question whether the nayas are the proponents of alien philosophies or independent upholders of opposition inspired by diverse opinions and answers that they are only different estimates (literally, concepts derived from different angles of vision) of the object known. Yathava pratyaksanumanopamanaptavacanaih Pranamaireko rthah pramiyate svavisayaniyamat, na ca ta vipratipattaya bhavanti tadvad nayavada iti. It is also asserted in this connection the three is no contradiction between them, just as there is none between different instruments of knowledge, such as perception, inference, comparison and the words of a reliable person.

The expression Syadvada (conditional dialectics) is composed of two words, viz. 'Syat' and 'Verde'. 'Sat' is an indeclinable that appears like a verbal form in the potential mood. It stands for multiplicity, obligation, reasoning etc. But in the present context it stands for multiplicity or multiple character (anekanta). The term is also used to denote particular space and time, as well as probability (sambhavana) and doubt. The word Syat in the expression syadvada has not been used to mean doubt . It is used to denote multiplicity or multiple character (anekanta). The implication is that syadvada is the doctrine of the multiple character of real. It is a doctrine that is known as Anekanta or the non-absolutistic estimation of reality in its infinitely multiple character. This non-absolutistic estimation is definite in its character and free from all doubts as indicated by the expression syat which is absolutely free from any kind of association, direct or indirect, with the verbal form syat used in the potential mood of sanskrit conjugation of verbal roots. Probability (sambhavana) and relativity, however, are implied by the word 'syat'
        The word 'syat is necessary for the affirmation of the desired attribute to the exclusion of the undesired one. And this is why all the propositions, in order to be precise in meaning, should be accompanied by the use of the word 'syat'. The propositions without such express use of 'syat' should be understood to have that word implicitly. The word 'syat has a double implication:
(1) Negation without affirmation of affirmation without negation is not possible
(2) The generic attribute (continuity or the universal) and the specific attribute ( origination, cessation or the
particular) - both these are relative. We never experience origination-cessation without continuity or the latter
without the former.
        The nature of a real is not omnigeneous and so it exist in its own nature and does not exist in the nature of alien things, or , to be more exact, a real exist in its present mode and does not exist in its modes that have passed away or will come in the future
        The cycle of origination and cessation goes on uninterrupted. The mode that arises is the affirmation, whereas the mode that has passed away or is yet to arise is the negation of the object. Affirmation and negation
are thus simultaneous moments or the real.
        A sensuous cognition of an object is positive in character and never negative according to some thinkers.
The inference (anumana) is, however, positive and negative both. According to the conditional dialectics (syadvada) affirmation and negation are the attributes of the real. We perceive fire and the affirmation in this case means that the fire exist in a particular place. when we try to infer fire from smoke, the existence of smoke proves the existence of fire in a particular place while the existence of a contradictory probans ( hetu) proves the non-existence of fire. But the affirmation or the negation in the conditional dialectics is not related to space or time of the object. They are related to determination of the nature of the object. The fire in a particular place or time exist in its own nature, that is, its affirmation is dependent on its constituents and its denial is dependent on the element that do not constitute its character. Affirmation and negation are coexistence in an object. On account of its positive character a thing is existent in its own nature, while on account of its negative aspects it is not mixed up with what is other than it self. In other words, the nature of an object is definite on account of its self affirmation and negation of alien elements. This is indeed the reality of the real. The word 'syat' defines this definiteness of the nature of an object.

        The conditional dialectics (syadvada) is also known as the exposition by the division ( vibhajyavada) or the doctrine of alternative (bhajanavada). This follows from the following exhortation of Lord Mahavira: 'A monk should take resort to the doctrine of exposition by division (vibhajyavada) ; he should utilize all possible all alternatives and should never adhere to an absolutistic attitude in explaining the nature of a thing. ' The Lord himself explain many a problem by means of this method of division.
        Once Jayanti asked the Lord which was better between the states of slumber and awakening.
        'For some souls, O Jayanti! the slumber is commendable, but for others awakening is wholesome.'
        'Why is it so, O Lord!?'
        'The slumber is wholesome for those who are engaged in sinful activities, while for the virtuous awakening is a commendable.'
        The exclusive assertion of the wholesomeness of slumber or awakening would be an absolutistic answer which was not approved by Lord Mahavira who explained all the questions by means of division of issues avoiding exclusiveness.
        If the identity of the substance and the attributes is accepted, both will merge into each other, loosing their duality, and as a consequence the proposition 'the attribute subsists in a substance' would be impossible.
        If, again, the attribute were absolutely different from the substance, the proposition ' this attribute belong to this substance' would be impossible, because in the absence of some sort of identity the proposition would be meaningless. According to the doctrine of alternatives (bhajanavada) the rule of exclusiveness of identity or difference cannot be acceptable. The doctrine of alternatives (bhajanavada) approves of both identity and difference. The adjective substantive relationship between the substance attribute would be impossible if there were absolute identity between them. 'A man with a beard is coming', in this proposition the expression 'with a beard' is the adjective of the expression 'man' which is the substantive. The adjective must be in some respect different from the substantive, and this is why the substantive-adjective relationship does not offer any logical inconsistency in accepting the relationship of identity -cum-difference between the substance and its attributes.
        There is no contradiction between the positum and the negatum. This is the implication or pre-supposition of the doctrine of conditional dialectics (syadvada). The duality of apparently contrary attributes enjoy mutual concomitance. It is on this finding that the doctrine of non-absolutism (anekantavada) as a synthesis of infinite number of such dualities established. The conditional dialectic (syadvada) is, in essence, the system of propositions expressing such multiple character of the real. In these propositions affirmation, negation and such other alternatives define the nature of the real. This can be demonstrated by the doctrine of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi) which is as follows:
1.     The pot certainly (eva) exists in some respect (syat).
2.     The pot certainly (eva) does not exists in some respect (syat).
3.     The pot certainly (eva) exists and does not exists in some respect (syat).
4.     The pot is certainly (eva) indescribable is some respect (syat).
5.     The pot certainly (eva) exists and is indescribable in some respect (syat).
6.     The pot certainly (eva) does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (syat).
7.     The pot certainly (eva) exists, certainly does not exist and is indescribable in some respect (syat).
        It represents the existence of the pot, relegating the other attributes to a secondary position by excluding           them from the intended area of reference.

         The expression 'eva' (certainly) in the above propositions indicates the definite character of the assertion or the negation indescribability or their possible combinations. Sometimes it is suggested that the expression 'also' (api) should be substituted for the expression 'certainly' (eva) in the above propositions. But such substitution would not carry much meaning. Without the use of the expression 'certainly' (eva) the intended attributes (existence, non-existence etc.) would not be definitely determined. In the absence of relativism indicated by the phrase 'in some respect' (syat) the use of the expression 'certainly' (eva) would confer an absolutistic import on the propositions. But by the use of the word 'syat' (in some respect) indicative of relativism, the expression 'certainly' (eva) loses the absolutistic import and confers definiteness on the intended attributes predicated in the propositions.
        The expression 'eva' (exclusively) is used to serve three purposes :-

1.     The exclusion of non-relationship. (ayogavyavaccheda)
2.     The exclusion of the relationship with other (anyayogavyavaccheda)
3.     The exclusion of absolute non-relationship (anyayogavyavaccheda)
        In the proposition 'the conch is while exclusively' there is the exclusion of non-relationship. The expression 'eva' (exclusively) is attached to the adjective. When the whiteness of the conch is under query, the assertion is made that the conch is white exclusively.
        In the proposition ;partha alone is the archer', the exclusion of archership from any person other than partha (Arjuna) is intended. Nobody is in doubt about the archership of partha, but the use of the expression 'exclusively' (eva) is used to set at rest the common doubt as to whether there is any other person equal to partha in the art of archery.
        In the proposition 'a blue louts certainly exists', the absolute non-relationship (between a lotus and blueness) is excluded. In this proposition 'certainly' (eva) is attached to the verb 'exists' in order to exclude the doubt about the affirmation of universal existence or absolute non-existence (of blueness in the lotus).
        In the proposition 'the pot certainly exists in some respect', the word 'pot is the substantive and the word 'exists' is the adjective. The word 'certainly' (eva) is connected with the adjective (viz. asti) and determines the attribute of existence of the pot. If the phrase 'in some respect' (syat) were not used in the proposition, the admission of absolute existence would be the result, which was not desirable, because there are also attributes other than existence in the pot. The use of the expression 'syat' (in some respect) precludes such undesirable consequences. It also widens the limits imposed by the expression 'eva' (certainly). The unambiguous assertion of the intended attribute and the comprehension of many an unmentioned attribute are effected by the joint use of words 'syat' and 'eva'.
        In the doctrine of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi) affirmation and negation of the predicate are respectively made in the first two propositions, the predominant features in the first being position and in the second negation. The attribute verbally mentioned is evidently predominant, while the attribute not so mentioned, but only understood, is secondary and subordinate.
        A thing is not absolutely devoid of it's own nature and so it is described by means of affirmation as predominant character nor is it omnigenous and so it is described by means of negation as a predominant factor. Negation is as much an attribute of a thing as affirmation. A pot has existence in respect of it's own substance. This is affirmation. The pot has non-existence in respect of an alien substance. This is negation. Apparently thus the negation is a relative mode, that is, a mode with reference to another thing. But truly speaking this is not so. Negation is an intrinsic potency of a thing. A substance, if it were exclusively possessed of the attribute of existence bereft of non-existence, would not be able to preserve it's substancehood. Negation is a predicted with reference to other things so it is called relative or 'dependent on others'. The negation acts as a protecting shield by not allowing the encroachment of alien existence. A pot exists in respect of it's own substance and does not exist in respect of an alien substance - both these propositions revel the truth that the pot is a relative entity, as much dependent on itself as on others for it's definite nature. This relativism falsifies either of the propositions, viz. the moment of existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence or that the moment of non-existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence. Existence and non-existence (affirmation and negation) are simultaneous. But this simultaneity is incapable of being expressed by a single word at a single moment. This is why a third proposition is requisitioned for expressing the simultaneity of existence and non-existence through the expression 'indescribable' (avaktavya). The implication is that the existence and non-existence are necessarily co-existent, but they are unspeakable simultaneously by a single expression on account of the absence of any linguistic symbol capable of discharging this ambivalent function.
        It would follow from the above that there are only three fundamental predicable, viz. existent, non-existent and indescribable. The remaining four predicables are but the different combination of these three taken two or three at a time. In the Agamic period the use of three predicables was mostly in vogue. The use of the seven predicables is also found in some cases.
        Once Gautama asked Lord Mahariva-'O Lord! is a two spaced aggregate self, not-self or indescribable?'
        Lord replied - 'O Gautama! a two spaced aggregate is self in some respect, not-self in some respect and indescribable in some respect.'
        Gautama said - 'How is it so, O Lord!?'
        Mahavira replied - 'O Gautama! It is self in respect of its own nature, it is not- self in respect of alien nature and it is indescribable in respect of both.'

        Four additional predicable follows spontaneously, viz.-

1.    A two spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is not self in some respect.
2.    A two spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
3.    A two spaced aggregate is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
        The seventh predicable follows in respect of a three spaced aggregate-
4.    A three spaced aggregate is self in some respect, is not-self in some respect, is indescribable in some respect.
        A thing is positive and negative rolled into one. The doctrine of sevenfold predication has been framed on the basis of this dual attribute of position and negation. The dualities of universal particular, permanent-impermanent, describable-indescribable can also constitute this system of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi). Each of these dualites can be used as the predicates of the seven proposition. Three proposition constituted by these duals are given below by way of illustration. It should be noted here that the Jaina philosopher's conception of universal is quite different from that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. The Jains substitute similarity for universal_
1.    The pot certainly is similar in some respect.
        The pot certainly is different in some respect.
        The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.
2.    The pot certainly is permanent in some respect.
        The pot certainly is impermanent in some respect
        The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.
3.    The pot certainly is speakable in some respect.
        The pot certainly is unspeakable in some respect.
        The pot certainly is indescribable in some respect.

        Each attribute of an object can give rise to a system of sevenfold predication (saptabhangi). Permanence and impermanence being mutually contradictory attributes, how could they qualify the same pot. It is on the basis of relativism that a synthesis is established between these mutually opposed attributes.

        The Greek poet-philosopher Heraclitus of the 6th -5th century B.C believed in the doctrine of the co-existence of contraries. His relativism is the spur which pricks the side of a sluggish conservatism in all departments of life-taste and morals, politics and society- and it is the absence of relativism that, according to Heraclitus, is responsible for absolutisms and stagnation in philosophical thinking. Heraclitus announced for the first time in Greek thought the principle of relativity of qualities which he pushed forthwith to its extreme consequences in the words 'good and bad are the same', 'we are and we are not'. The movement of life, according to him, is like the back-returning of the bow, to which he compares it, an energy of traction and tension restraining an energy of release, every force of action compensated by a corresponding force of reaction. By the resistance of one to the other all the harmonies of existence are created.

        Heraclitus was a fluxist and, therefore, a relativist. In point of fact his doctrine of flux and his doctrine of relativity lead to the same result; the successive states of an object as well as its simultaneous qualities frequently both the stamp of a far-reaching diversity which amounts at complete contradiction. In one aspect, according to him, X is 'good', in another aspect it is 'bad'. He believed in a fundamental law in the natural as well as the spiritual world that contraries were not mutually exclusive, but rather pre-supposed and conditional, or were even identical with each other. His theory of relativity contained like a folded flower the correct doctrine of sense-perception with its recognition of the subjective factor, and it taught Greek thinkers the lesson they were bound to acquire if they were to be saved from a bottomless scepticism.
        The relativism of Heraclitus is based on fluxism. But the basis of relativism of the Jaina philosopher is quite different, according to whom the momentarines is as much dependent on permanence as the latter is dependent on the former. Momentariness and permanence both together constitute the nature of the real. They do not occur in succession but are co-existent and inseparable. Change or momentarines is only one aspect of the thing and is meaningless with out its co-ordinate, viz. the permanence. Relativity, in fact, is understandable
on the interdependence of the aspects. viz. momentarines and permanence, in the absence of which it is unthinkable. It is only on the simultaneous existence of the two country aspects or attributes relativity acquires a meaning.

        Sri Aurobindo thinks that Heraclitus seems to recognize the inextricable unity of the internal and the transitory, that which is for ever end yet seem to exist only in this strife and change which is a continual dying.
If this estimate is acceptable, the philosophy of Heraclitus would be never to the Jaina standpoint. But even than the Jaina philosopher would disagree because the transitoriness and eternality are co-ordinate factors, neither being sub-ordinate to the other, as sri Aurobindo or the Vedantists would like to believe. Acarya Amrtacandra has brought out the equipollence of the two contrary attributes by the examples of churning by a milkmaid, who moves her left and right arm alternately in opposite directions to make butter, thus exercising both the arms in succession. in the doctrine of conditional dialectics (syadvada), similarly, of the two contrary attributes one is assigned prominence by relegating the other to the background at a time. This explains the nature of relativism or relativity of the Jaina philosopher. None of the attributes is subordinate to the other, both being active in their own way to discharge their respective functions and constitute the nature of the real.

1.    In the science of logic causality is a universal postulate. But in the conditional dialectic causality is not a universally applicable principal which is active only in the gross world. The subtle or the micro-cosmic world is governed by its own rules where the cause effect relationship becomes too thin to be recognized. The succession of cause and effect becomes meaningless at that stage. Momentarines changes into smooth passing from one state to another without any gap. Origination and cessation become meaningless. In the language of the traditional karma doctrine the causal concatenation can be detected in the phenomena of the fruition or disappearance of karma. The changes taking place in the gross atomic aggregates also appear as subject to causality. However, in the changes that are spontaneous and intrinsic, the principle of causality is not applicable in the ordinary sense of the term. In jaina ontology it is averred that the colour of an atom definitely changes after the lapse of a definite period, the cause of such change being undefined. An atom is here governed by its own intrinsic nature. The instantaneous modality (artha paryaya) of an atom is beyond the range of the principle of causality. A substance undergoes intact in the succeeding moment provided the former could mould itself in consonance with the latter. The nature of the instantaneous mode (artha paryaya) has found expression in the following traditional verse- Anadinidhane loke, svaparyayah pratiksanam/ utpadyante vipadyante, jalakallolavajjale//         'In the substance, which is without beginning and without end, the modes arise and vanish by themselves every moment like the waves that emerge in the ocean without interruption.'
        The doctrine of causality finds proper place and exposition in the pantoscopic, analytic and momentary viewpoints (that take note of the prolonged mode.)
        The doctrine of causality assumes quite a different meaning that is tantamount to its abrogation in the verbal, etymological and functional viewpoints. An effect arises by its own nature spontaneously according to these viewpoints. An effect cannot depend on anything else for its origination. It is meaningless to say that a self created object has a cause that is a something other than itself. When the cause and effect are identical, it is redundant to assert a relationship tertium quid between the two. It follows, therefore, that an effect arises spontaneously and intrinsically from and by itself independent of anything outside it.

2.        The existence of mode is made subordinate and ignored in the purely substantial viewpoint (suddha dravyarthika-naya), and therefore the division of time into the past, Future and present do not exist, The three verbal viewpoint (sabda-nayas), being concerned with 'becoming, accept modes and, therefore, there division of time are real according to them. The implication is that the unchanging aspect of the substance is timeless, the instantaneous mode being just momentary is also virtually timeless. It is only the verbal or conceptual mode (vyanjana-paryya) that depends on the division of time, being a sort of prolonged existence. The substance in its three aspects virtually represents three different systems of philosophy, viz. the monistic Vedanta that believes in absolutely unchanging Brahma, the Buddist fluxism that adumbrates unceasing change and Nyaya-vaisesika that believes in both permanence and change.

3.      The substance consists in modes that are successive and non-successive. Such modes exist in the present in the aspects as intendent or known by the cogniser, but do not exist in those aspects in the other division of time. This differentiation of aspect owing to the condition of time is matched by a similar differentiation on account of other causes and conditions as well. A novel system of sevenfold predication of the conditional dialectic (syadvada) can be conceived on this variety of causes and conditions, viz.
1.    The Substance is one.-
2.    It exists in some respect.
3.    It has an originating condition.
4.    It has a source of origin.
5.     It is also related to something else.
6.    It also has a location.
7.    It has also a time.
        Among the modes that occur in succession it is only the present one that is definite, whereas the modes that are to come are not regulated by any rule regarding their probability and indefinite occurrence. It is not possible to predict definite could necessarily occur in succession of a particular mode. In this quantum mechanics according to which it is impossible to assert in terms of the ordinary conventions of geometrical position and of motion that a particle (as an electron) is at the same time at a specified point and moving with a specified velocity, for the more accurately either factor can be measured, the less accurately the other can be asserted.

4.      The doctrine of conditional dialectic (syadvada) is applicable not only for the explanation of spatial, temporal and quantitative relative modes, but it can be validly applied for ascertaining the intrinsic modes of the substance. Permanence and impermanence are the intrinsic modes which appear as contraries in the gross world. These are not contrary in essence and, therefore, their contrariety can be solved by relativity.

5.         In the context of the doctrine of conditional dialectic (syadvada) a study of the relativity of the modern science is very valuable. Some expert statisticians have studied this sevenfold predication of the doctrine of conditional dialectic in the light of the principles of statistics. We quote here an excerpt from an article of Prof. P.C.Mahalanobis--
    'I should now like to make some brief observations of my own on the connection between Indian-Jaina views and the foundations of statistical theory. I have already pointed out that the fourth category of syadvada, namely avaktavya or the indeterminate is a synthesis of three earlier categories of (1) assertion ('it is'), (2) negation ('it is not'), and (3) assertion and negation in succession. The fourth category of syadvada, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualification of syadvada, therefore, seems to me to be in essence the qualitative (but not quantitative) aspect of the modern concept of probability. Used in a purely qualitative, the fourth category of predication in jaina logic corresponds precisely to the meaning of probability which covers the possibility of (a) Something existing, (b) Something not-existing, and (c) Sometimes existing and Sometimes not      existing. The difference between jaina 'avakatvya' and 'probability' lies in the fact that the latter ( that is, the concept of probability) has definite quantitative implications, namely, the recognition of numerical frequencies of occurrence of (1) 'it is', or (2) 'it is not', and hence in the recognition of relative numerical frequencies of the first two categories of 'it is' and 'it is not' in a synthetic form. It is the explicit recognition of (and emphasis on) the concept of numerical frequency ratios which distinguishes modern statistical theory from the jaina theory of syadvada. At the same time it is of interest to not that 1500 or 2000 years ago syadvada seems to have given the logical background of statistical theory in a qualitative form.
        Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the jaina view that 'a real is a particular which possesses a generic attributes'. This is a very close concept of an individual in relation to the population to which it belongs. The jaina view, in fact, denies the possibility of making any predication about a single and unique individual which would be true in modern statistical theory.
        The third point to be noted is the emphasis given in jaina philosophy on the related of things and on the multiform aspects of reals which appear to b similar (again in a purely qualitative sense) to the basic ideas underlying the concept of association, correlation and concomitant variation in modern statistics.
        The jaina view of 'existence, persistence and cessation' as the fundamental characteristics of all that is real necessarily leads to a view of reality as something relatively permanent and relatively changing which has a flavour of statistical reasoning. 'A real changes every moment and at the same time continues , is a view which is somewhat sympathetic to the underlying idea of stochastic processes.
        Fifthly the most important feature of jaina logic is its instance on the impossibility of absolutely certain predication and its emphasis on non- absolutist and relativist predication. In syadvada the qualification 'syat' that is 'may be or perhaps' must be attached to every predication, according to syadvada, thus, has a margin of uncertainty which is somewhat similar to the concept of 'uncertain inference' in modern statistical theory. The jaina view, however, is essentially qualitative in this manner ( while the great characteristics of modern statistical theory is insistence on the possibility and significance of determining the margin of uncertainty in a meaningful way). The rejection of absolutely certain predication naturally leads to jaina philosophy continually to emphasize the inadequacy of 'pure' or 'informal' logic, and hence to stress the need of making inferences on the basis of data supplied by experience.
        I should also like to point out that the jaina view of causality as 'a relation of determination' based on the observation of 'concomitance in agreement and in difference' has dual reference to an internal condition 'in the developed state of our mind' which would seem to correspond to the state of organized knowledge in any given context and also to an external condition based on the repeated observation of the sequence of the two events' which is suggestive of a statistical approach.
        Finally, I should draw attention to the realist and pluralist views of jaina philosophy and the continuing emphasis on the multiform and infinitely diversified aspects of reality which amounts to the acceptance of an 'open' view of the universe with scope for unending change and discovery. For reasons explained above, it seems to me that the ancient Indian Jaina philosophy has certain interesting resemblances to the probabilistic and statistical view of reality in modern times.

Question 1. How can syat mean 'in some respect' ? Is it not a verbal form in the potential mood?

Answer. Just as the expression 'asti' in the sentence 'the world is inhabited by the heroes' (astivira vasundhara), is an indeclinable (nipata), exactly so in the expression 'syatvada' the word 'syst' is an indeclinable. It is not used to denote the potential mood. It
is possessed of many senses, one of them being 'in some respect.'

Question 2. Both the sentient and the non-sentient are possessed of infinite number of attributes. What, then, is the line of demarcation between them, when it has been virtually asserted that everything has the nature of everything-a proposition which
expresses the universal property of a real (both sentient and nonsentient)?

Answer. The attributes are of two kinds - generic and specific. By the specific attributes a substance is defined in its independent and discrete aspect. Sentience is one such specific attribute which belongs to the substance that is sentient and not to what is non-sentient. From the viewpoint of the attribute 'sentience' there is absolute difference between the sentient and non-sentient. And this is why the sentient and the non-sentient are absolutely different substances. Every substance is possessed
of infinite number of attributes. All the substances have their own separate identities due to their uncommon properties and so the samkhya-yoga dictum that 'every things is possessed of the nature of everything (sarvam sarvatmakam)' is not acceptable to Jainas, who do not admit the evolution of the physical cosmos from the single principle of prakrti (primordial matter).
The existence of sentience in a sentient being is natural and independent of anything else. In the non-sentient material particle or body there are attributes that are natural and intrinsic ,viz. .colour, smell, taste and touch. All attributes, momentary or durable, originating from the combination of modes that are intrinsic as well as extrinsic.

Question 3. The Naiyayikas and others also define the nature of an object by means of a determining characteristic, just as in the system of conditional dialectic (syadvada) the nature of the real is determined by a specific attribute. What, then, is the difference between the two philosophies, as both of them admit a real as independent of anything else so far as its own nature is concerned? There must be a point of departure between the two which should characterize the Jaina thinker's standpoint as the proponent of relativity as implied in the conditional dialectic (syadvada).

Answer . In the proposition 'the soul certainly exists in some respect', that is, in its aspect of sentience, the existence of sentience is affirmed ; that does not mean that existence alone is its own characteristic, but that non-existence also is an equally valid aspect of it. Here the question may arise that if the extraneous non-existence is a nature of the soul, then the colour etc. of
physical objects should also be considered as the nature of the latter. The solution is obvious. That both existence and non-existence constitute the nature of a thing is attested by experience, just as smoke and fire exist in the same locus, say a kitchen. Existence and non-existence are similarly concomitant attributes, there being a nature relationship (svabhava-sambandha) between the two. This in essence is the principle of relativity propounded by the doctrine of conditional dialectic (syadvada).
The nature of the substance does not follow from the doctrine of conditional dialectic. The substance is as it is by nature. One cannot explain why that is so. Philosophy does not create a real. It only explains it. And exactly this is the aim and purpose of conditional dialectic. The Jaina philosopher admits five special qualities on the basis of experience which are responsible for the postulation of five substances

QUALITY	SUBSTANCE
1. Motion	Dharmastikaya (the substance which is the media of motion)
2. Rest	Adharmastikaya (the substance which is the medium of rest)
3. Accommodation	Akasastikaya- Space (the substance which is the medium of accommodation).
4. Colour, smell, taste and touch	Matter
5. Consciousness	Soul

(We have not translated the word 'astikaya' in the above renderings. The above substance are called 'astikaya' because they have extension and are conceived as consisting of space-point, countable, countless or infinite.)
All the qualities other than the above five are generic attributes. The distinction between them is explained by means of conditional dialectic (syadvada).

Question 4. It has been said that the sevenfold predication can be applicable with respect to each and every attribute of a substance. If so, is the non-absolutism (relativism) itself available to the system of sevenfold predication ? If the reply is in the affirmative, the predication of negation (that is, the second among the seven propositions) would be a kind of absolutism. And in this way non-absolutism (relativism) would not be a universally applicable doctrine.

Answer. Acarya Samantabhadra has explained non-absolutism (relativism) from the non-absolutistic standpoint itself. When the system of conditional dialectic is applied for the knowledge and exposition of an object in its entirety, non-absolutism (relativism) is proper and genuine. And when only a particular attribute is cognised and explained, the services of a particular naya (viewpoint) is requisitioned and that is a sort of absolutism, ekanta (singular viewpoint). The propounder of non-absolutism (relativism) admits both non-absolutism and absolutism in their proper perspective. This is why the system of sevenfold predication (sapatabhangi) is applicable to non-absolutism (relativism) itself in the following manner.

1.    There is absolutism in some respect.
2.    There is non-absolutism in some respect.
3.    There are both absolutism and non-absolutism in some respect.
4.    There is indescribability in some respect.
5.    There is absolutism and indescribability in some respect.
6.    There is non-absolutism and indescribability in some respect.
7.    There is absolutism, non-absolutism and indescribability in some respect.

        There is no contradiction in absolutism by itself. What is denied is only the absolutism that refutes the contrary viewpoint. absolutism thus is twofold, viz. right and wrong. The absolutism that is right is naya, while the wrong one is pseudo-naya. Non-absolutism is not an obstinate and rigid doctrine because the admission of the co-existence of contrary attributes not attested by any valid source of knowledge does not fall with in the purview of genuine non-absolutism. Thus non-absolutism is of two kinds, viz. right and wrong. The former is valid knowledge, while the latter is a sham simulation of it. The right non-absolutism has a universal application.
        Acarya Akalanka has subjected the substance 'jiva' to the system of sevenfold predication as follows-
        *The soul exists (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.
        *The soul does not exist (in its aspect of consciousness) in some respect.
        The implication of the above two propositions is that the soul is a conscious substance only so far as its activity of consciousness is concerned. But it has also other aspects, such as the aspect of being a cognitum or an agent of will, and so on, which are the attributes that are not opposed to reason and logic are the subject-matter of the doctrine of non-absolutism.

Question 5. Is relativity itself subject to the system of sevenfold predication? If so, the admission of an absolutistic truth would be inevitable.

Answer. An object is relative in some respect and non-relative (absolute) in another. Both these alternatives may be acceptable. From the standpoint of the instantaneous or spontaneous mode (artha-paryaya) a thing is absolutely independent of anything else. The substance of space is nothing but space from the standpoint of its instantaneous mode (artha-paryaya). A thing is a relative reality from the standpoint of extraneous and alien modes. Viewed from the standpoint of relativity the same substance of space is perceived as circumscribed by a jar or a canvas, etc. All the prolonged modes (vyanjana-paryaya) are relative aspects. There is not a single element in the cosmos that may be described as independent of anything else. But every substance is a synthesis of the absolute and the relative, which can never be absolutely disconnected, Such disconnection itself can be effected only relatively. The modes are intertwined and can never be disentangled, though the instantaneous mode (artha-paryaya) can be called independent in contradistinction to the prolonged modes (vyanjana-paryana) that are relative.